In April 1967, Odumegwu Ojukwu and his closest advisors gathered to discuss the future of the Igbo people in tense meetings that pitched idealism against realism. Many idealists, including Ojukwu himself, felt that the persecution of Igbo in the North was unacceptable and the only appropriate response would be the creation of an Igbo state, financed by oil. Citing the 30,000 Igbo killed and 1.8 million displaced, they argued the Federal Government was marred with racial prejudice and would never sufficiently protect the Igbo.

The pragmatists counter-argued that it was unrealistic to try for independence. They cited Nigeria’s superiority in wealth and numbers to argue that a secession fight would be unsuccessful and just lead to more Igbo deaths. They encouraged working with the Nigerian government to address Igbo grievances. They argued the government would use extreme force to keep the country unified and control oil revenues.

As Ojukwu’s closest advisers, delegates will need to debate and decide which approach to take. Is it possible to move past the oppression and live in peace with the northern Nigerians? How can one guarantee that the status of the Igbo people will improve without taking drastic measures? Considering the asymmetry of power between Nigeria and the people of southern Nigeria, is it realistic to believe they can defeat the Nigerians? Both secession and reconciliation allow for the possibility of progress or disaster; neither should be agreed upon without a contingency plan.

Chair: Lesedi Mbatha,